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Rudolf Carnap, W. V. Quine, and Hilary Putnam are probably the three most central 
figures in mid-twentieth-century American philosophy. Their debates about meaning, 
translation, and ontology largely set the agenda for analytic philosophers in the first 
decades after WWII. Most historians believe that beneath these philosophical debates 
lies a more fundamental disagreement about the nature of science, philosophy, and 
our methods of inquiry. That is, Quine is often viewed as slaying the (supposedly) 
Carnapian distinction between science and philosophy, whereas Putnam is commonly 
read as dismissing both Carnap’s positivism and Quine’s scientific naturalism.  
In this excellent volume of essays, Gary Ebbs offers an exciting alternative 
interpretation. In eleven essays, an introduction, and an afterword, he argues that at 
this more fundamental level, Carnap’s, Quine’s, and Putnam’s positions are largely 
the same. According to Ebbs, the three all accept the following four principles about 
the nature of inquiry:  
 
(1) In our pursuit of truth, we can do no better than to start in the middle, 
relying on already established beliefs and inferences and applying our 
best methods for reevaluating particular beliefs and inferences and 
arriving at new ones. 
(2) No part of our supposed knowledge, no matter how clear it seems to us 
or how firmly we now hold it, is unrevisable or guaranteed to be true. 
(3) Insofar as traditional philosophical conceptions of reason, justification, 
and apriority conflict with the first two principles, they should be 
abandoned. 
(4) A central task of philosophy is to clarify and facilitate our rational 
inquiries by replacing terms and theories that we find useful in some 
ways, but problematic in others, with new terms and theories that are as 
clear and unproblematic to us as the terms and methods of our best 
scientific theories. (pp. 1-2) 
 
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam, in other words, all dismiss traditional inflated 
conceptions of philosophical inquiry and replace them with a deeply fallibilistic, 
explication-based picture in which there is no perspective external to the discourses 
we find useful in our everyday and scientific inquiries. Or, as Carnap put it, “all work 
is done according to strict scientific methods and not by means of ‘higher’ or 
‘deeper’ insights” (Carnap 1934, 46).  
In developing this alternative reading, Ebbs does not aim to downplay the 
philosophical disagreements between Carnap, Quine, and Putnam. Instead, he offers 
a reinterpretation of those discussions. Rather than dismissing the debate about the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, for instance, he shows that Quine, in arguing that 
Carnap has failed to “explain [the] term ‘analytic’ in a language suited for and used 
in the mature natural sciences” (p. 133) is just adopting Carnap’s method of inquiry 
and improving his views from within. He was, as Quine himself has argued, “just 
being more Carnapian than Carnap in being critical in this question” (Quine 1994, 
228). Likewise, in discussing the Quine-Putnam debate about transtheoretical terms, 
Ebbs interprets Putnam as out-Quining Quine in urging for an account of truth and 
reference that accords with “the identifications of agreements and disagreements […] 
that we actually make in the midst of our everyday and scientific inquiries” (p. 206). 
Although Ebbs’ historical claim raises some questions—e.g. Is his reading of 
Carnap compatible with Michael Friedman’s ‘Kantian interpretation’?; How would 
he explain the numerous miscommunications between Carnap and Quine in the 
1940s and 1950s?; And could his fundamental principles (1)-(4) also be used to 
explain Putnam’s frequent changes of position?—the reader should not expect a 
detailed discussion of such questions. This is not a complaint however. For Ebbs 
chooses a different method to justify his reading. Rather than starting from a neutral 
position between several competing interpretations and trying to make a case for his 
interpretation over the other contenders, he starts from the assumption that his 
reading of Carnap, Quine, and Putnam is correct and shows that it can help us to (i) 
clarify their views, (ii) to dissolve some influential objections to their positions, and 
(iii) to improve on their views by showing how his interpretation opens new and 
previously overlooked alternative accounts of truth, justification, and language use. 
Ebbs, in other words, is himself adopting the very method of inquiry he attributes to 
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam; he is ‘starting in the middle’ and he aims to “improve, 
clarify, and understand” their positions “from within” (Quine 1975, 72). 
Because it is impossible to discuss all eleven essays in one review, let me 
discuss some examples of each of the strategies (i)-(iii). In Chapter 3, “Carnap and 
Quine on Truth by Convention”, first published in Mind,1 Ebbs shows how his 
																																																								
1 Nine of the eleven essays in the volume have been previously published. The 
Chapters 2 (“Carnap on Ontology”) and 6 (“Reading Quine’s Claim that Definitional 
Abbreviations Create Synonymies”) as well as the Introduction and the Afterword are 
new.  
reading of the Carnap-Quine debate can help us to clarify Quine’s goals in “Truth by 
Convention” (1936). Ebbs argues that Quine’s arguments against the idea that logic 
is true by convention were not aimed at Carnap but were the result of an attempt to 
evaluate an option that Quine himself found appealing. Ebbs shows that the standard 
interpretation of “Truth by Convention” is misguided on at least two points: (a) 
Carnap was never committed to the view that Quine dismisses and (b) Quine himself 
believed that some parts of science (e.g. set theory) are true by convention. But is not 
Quine’s naturalism incompatible with the view that some claims are true by 
convention? It is precisely at this point that Ebbs’ novel interpretation illuminates 
Quine’s position: 
 
a scientific naturalist selects and formulates the truths that ‘count for 
most’. [Quine] begins with the obvious point that the truths that ‘count’ 
for most’ for a scientific naturalist are just the ones she affirms when, in 
the course of her inquiries, she adopts particular scientific theories and 
hypotheses. All these truths may be called ‘explanatory’ in one good, 
though very broad, sense of that flexible word. The truths that are 
‘explanatory’ in this encompassing sense are just the ones that it is the 
aim of science to affirm. It follows that we have no grip on what it is to 
be ‘explanatory’ in this encompassing sense apart from our own ongoing 
scientific inquir[i]es. In particular, if in the course of our inquiries we set 
forth some axioms or postulates “unaccompanied by any attempt at 
justification other than in terms of elegance and convenience” (Quine 
[1963, 393]), then these truths count as ‘explanatory’ in the same broad 
sense that theories and hypotheses in physics do. (pp. 80-81) 
 Note that this account has serious implications for what has often been called the 
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Although Ebbs, except for some brief 
remarks on page 60, does not drive this point home, his account implies that Quine 
(and Putnam?) do not have to worry about the parts of set theory that are 
‘dispensable’ from a physicist’s point of view. Quine’s notorious defense of the 
axiom of constructibility (V = L), for example, can be simply read as an attempt to 
submit set theory “to the considerations of simplicity, economy, and naturalness that 
contribute to the molding of scientific theories generally” (Quine 1992, 95); it does 
not have to be interpreted as a desperate attempt to adjust his views about set theory 
such that they are compatible with his indispensability defense. Ebbs’ reading, in 
other words, implies that the indispensability thesis should be interpreted differently; 
it should simply be read as the judgment that our best overall empirical theory of 
nature contains set theory (in particular, in most of Quine’s work, a set theory 
governed by the axiom of constructibility). 
Chapter 5 (“Quine Gets the Last Word”) is an excellent example of how Ebbs’ 
interpretation can contribute to dissolving a wide variety of influential objections to 
Carnap’s, Quine’s, and Putnam’s views. This paper, first published in The Journal of 
Philosophy, is mandatory reading for anyone working on Quine. Ebbs shows how a 
broad range of influential objections to Quine’s views—e.g. Jaegwon Kim’s 
argument that there is no room for a normative notion of justification in a naturalized 
epistemology or H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson’s claim that Quine’s naturalism leads 
to the conclusion that our sentences are meaningless—ultimately boil down to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Quine’s radical minimalist understanding of 
language use. Kim, Grice, and Strawson (but also Thomas Nagel, Saul Kripke, John 
McDowell, and Michael Dummett) fail to see that if we are truly working from 
within, we do not require external extra-scientific criteria for justification, truth, and 
significance. As Ebbs puts it in his reply to Kim, for example, the objection that 
Quine’s project has nothing to do with epistemology is valid “only if we cling 
dogmatically to the claim that if we abandon the traditional epistemologist’s 
assumption that there are substantive general principles for evaluating and justifying 
assertions, we lose our grip on what it is to justify, defend, and revise our assertions 
from the standpoint of a given scientific discipline” (p. 125). The point of Quine’s 
naturalism, Ebbs shows, is that the traditional epistemologist’s assumption can be 
abandoned without loss.  
Chapter 10 (“Truth and Transtheoretical Terms”) is a nice example of one of 
Ebbs’ attempts to improve on the work of Carnap, Quine, and Putnam. In his 
Afterword, Ebbs explains that the essays in his volume together contribute to the 
development of  
 
a new minimalist conception of language use and justification that 
combines Tarski-style disquotational accounts of truth and satisfaction 
(reference) for the words we can directly use, with our practical 
identifications of words between speakers and across time, to yield a 
minimalist account of transtheoretical terms. (p. 257) 
 
Chapter 10 constitutes one of Ebbs’ most significant contributions to this new 
minimalist conception—an account he has developed in more detail in Truth and 
Words (2009). He submits that Putnam has convincingly shown that in science and in 
everyday life we often identify reference transtheoretically. When we now read Niels 
Bohr’s 1911 claim that electrons at each moment have a determinate position and 
momentum, for example, we generally take the reference of his term ‘electron’ to be 
the same as ours despite the fundamental changes in our theories about electrons 
(Putnam 1973, 197). Still, Ebbs shows that Putnam is mistaken when the latter 
argues that Quine’s deflationary theory of truth and reference leads to the conclusion 
that two speakers cannot genuinely agree or disagree with each other. Ebbs goes on 
to sketch a new theory of truth and reference that is both deflationary and does 
justice to Putnam’s conclusions about our actual practices of agreeing and 
disagreeing.  Likewise, new theoretical options are revealed and developed in 
Chapter 7 (“Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional 
Terms?”), where Ebbs outlines a new extensional definition of logical truth, and 
Chapter 9 (“Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a 
Dogma”), where he combines his account about our practices of identifying 
transtheoretical terms with a theory about revisable Bayesian confirmational 
commitments, while dismissing David Chalmers’ (2011) argument that Quine’s and 
Putnam’s claim that every belief is rationally revisable is incompatible with Bayesian 
conditionalization. 
Ebbs’ volume, in sum, is an important publication from both a historical and a 
systematic point of view. It offers a new perspective on the relation between Carnap, 
Quine, and Putnam as well as a substantive contribution to ongoing systematic 
debates about truth, justification, and language use. As such, Carnap, Quine, and 
Putnam on Methods of Inquiry will be of interest and value not only to historians of 
analytic philosophy, but also to all philosophers who believe that Carnap’s, Quine’s, 
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